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Abstract—Autonomous agents such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) have a great potential for deployment in next generation
wireless networks. While current literature has been mainly focused
on the use of UAVs for connectivity enhancement and routing in
military ad hoc networks, this paper proposes a novel usage model
for UAVs in wireless communication networks. In the proposed
model, a number of UAVs are required to collect data from a
number of randomly located tasks and transmit this data wirelessly
to a common receiver (such as the central command). Each
task represents a queue of packets that require collection and
transmission to the central receiver. The problem is modeled as
a hedonic coalition formation game between the UAVs and the
tasks that interact in order to form disjoint coalitions. Each formed
coalition is modeled as a polling system consisting of a number of
UAVs, designated as collectors, which act as a single server that
moves between the different tasks present in the coalition, collects
and transmits the packets to a common receiver. Within each
coalition, some UAVs can also take the role as a relay for improving
the packet success rate of the transmission. The proposed coalition
formation algorithm allows the tasks and the UAVs to take local
selfish decisions to join or leave a coalition, based on the achieved
benefit, in terms of effective throughput, and the cost in terms of
delay. Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm allows
the UAVs and tasks to self-organize into independent coalitions,
while improving the performance, in terms of average player (UAV
or task) payoff, of at least 61.96% relatively to a scheme that
allocates nearby tasks equally among UAVs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next generation wireless networks will present a highly
complex and dynamic environment. This is mainly due to the
recent emergence of large-scale, distributed and heterogeneous
communication systems which are continuously increasing in
size, traffic, applications, services, etc. For maintaining a sat-
isfactory operation of such networks, there is a constant need
for dynamically optimizing their performance, monitoring their
operation and reconfiguring their topology. Due to the ubiquitous
nature of such wireless networks, it is inherent to have self-
organizing autonomous nodes (agents), that can service these
networks at different levels such as data collection, monitoring,
optimization, management, maintenance, among others [1–4].
These nodes belong to the authority maintaining the network,
and must be able to survey large scale networks, and perform
very specific tasks at different points in time, in a distributed and
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autonomous manner, with very little reliance on any centralized
authority [1], [2].
While the use of such autonomous agents has been thor-
oughly investigated in robotics, control systems or software
engineering, research models that tackle the use of such agents
in wireless communication networks are rare. However, the need
for such nodes in wireless networks has become of noticeable
importance as many next generation networks are self-adapting
[1–4]. The main existing contributions in this area, within
wireless networking, are focused on deploying unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) which can act as autonomous agents (nodes)
in the network. In fact, in the past decade, UAVs have played
a prominent role as self-deploying autonomous nodes that can
efficiently perform pre-assigned tasks in numerous applications.
With the emergence of small “mini-UAVs” (MUAVs) that offer
advantages in flexibility and cost [5], the usage scenarios for
UAVs have significantly increased. In wireless networks, there
has been several contributions that tackle the use of UAVs in
connectivity improvement [6], routing [7], [8], and medium
access control [9].
Mainly, these contributions focus on centralized solutions for
specific problems such as finding the optimal locations for the
deployment of UAVs or devising efficient routing algorithms in
ad hoc networks in the presence of one or more UAVs. Hence,
in existing work, the tasks that the UAVs must accomplish are
pre-assigned and pre-determined. In contrast, many applications
require agents, such as UAVs, to autonomously perform specific
tasks that are randomly generated and are not pre-assigned. In
such applications, the objective is to provide algorithms that
allow the agents to share the tasks among each other with little
dependence on centralized entities. Several research activities
studied this task allocation problem among autonomous agents,
mainly in either robotics control [10–12], or software systems
[13], [14]. However, most of these models are unsuitable for
task allocation problems in the context of wireless networks due
to various reasons: (i)- The task allocation problems studied in
existing literature are mainly tailored for military operations or
software engineering, (ii)- the tasks are generally considered as
abstract entities with very simple characteristics, and (iii)- the
existing models do not consider any wireless communication
networks aspect such as the characteristics of the wireless
channel, the presence of data traffic, the need for wireless data
transmission, or other wireless-specific aspects.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
wireless communication-oriented model for the problem of task
allocation among a number of autonomous agents such as UAVs.
The proposed model considers a number of UAVs that are
required to collect data from randomly located tasks. Each
task represents a source of data, i.e., a queue with a Poisson
arrival of packets, that the UAVs must collect and transmit
via a wireless link to a central receiver. This formulation is
deemed suitable to model several problems in next generation
networks such as video surveillance in wireless networks, self-
deployment of mobile relays in IEEE 802.16j networks, data
collection in ad hoc networks, wireless monitoring of randomly
located sites, and many other applications. For allocating the
tasks, we introduce a novel framework from coalitional game
theory, known as hedonic coalition formation. Albeit hedonic
games have been widely used in game theory, to the best of
our knowledge, no existing work utilized this framework in a
communication or wireless environment. Thus, we model the
task allocation problem as a hedonic coalition formation game
between the UAVs and the tasks, and we propose an algorithm
for forming coalitions. Each formed coalition is modeled as a
polling system consisting of a number of UAVs, designated as
collectors, which act as a single server that moves continuously
between the different tasks (queues) present in the coalition,
gathering and transmitting the collected packets to a common
receiver. Further, within each coalition, some UAVs can act as
relays for improving the packet success rate during the wireless
transmission. For forming coalitions, the UAVs and tasks can
autonomously make a decision to join or leave a coalition
based on well defined individual preference relations. These
preferences are based on a coalition value function that takes
into account the benefits received from servicing a task, in terms
of effective throughput (data collected), as well as the cost in
terms of the polling system delay incurred from the time needed
for servicing all the tasks in a coalition. Simulation results show
how the proposed algorithm allows the network to self-organize,
while ensuring a performance improvement of at least 61.96%,
in terms of average player (task or UAV) payoff, compared to a
scheme that assigns nearby tasks equally among the UAVs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents and motivates the proposed system model. In
Section III, we model the task allocation problem as a hedonic
coalition formation game, we discuss its key properties and we
propose an algorithm for coalition formation. Simulation results
are presented, discussed and analyzed in Section IV. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network consisting of M agents, e.g., UAVs, that
belong to a single operator and are controlled by a central base
station, e.g., command center. The UAVs are required to service
T tasks that are randomly located in the geographic area around
the base station (BS). We denote the set of UAVs, and tasks
by M = {1, . . . ,M}, and T = {1, . . . , T}, respectively. We
assume that, in general, the number of tasks is larger than the
number of UAVs, hence, M > T . The main motivation behind
this assumption is that, for most networks, the number of UAVs
is generally small due to cost factors for example. Each task
i ∈ T represents an M/D/1 queueing system1, whereby packets
of constant size B are generated using a Poisson arrival with
an average arrival rate of λi. Hence, in the proposed model, we
consider different classes of tasks each having its corresponding
λi. These tasks can represent a group of mobile devices that
require servicing, data generated from video surveillance, data
that must be collected by the UAVs, or any other source of packet
data. For servicing a task, each UAV is required to move to the
task location, collect the data, and transmit it using a wireless
link to the centralized base station. Each UAV i ∈ M offers
a link transmission capacity of µi, in packets/sec, with which
the UAV can service the data from any of the tasks. Hence, the
quantity 1
µi
would represent the well known service time for a
single packet that is being serviced by a UAV i. The UAV which
is collecting the data from a task is referred to as collector. In
addition, each UAV i ∈M can transmit the data to the receiver
with a maximum transmit power of Pi = P˜ , assumed the same
for all UAVs (without loss of the generality for the analysis in
the remainder of this paper).
The proposed model allows each task to be serviced by
multiple UAVs, and also, each UAV (or group of UAVs) to
service multiple tasks. Whenever a task is serviced by multiple
UAVs, each UAV can act as either a collector or a relay. Any
group of UAVs that act together for data collection from the
same task, can be seen as a single collector with improved link
transmission capacity. In this context, given a group of UAVs
G ⊆M that are acting as collectors for a task i ∈ T , the total
link transmission capacity with which task i is being serviced
with by G can be given by
µiG =
∑
j∈G
µj , (1)
For forming a single collector, multiple UAVs can easily coordi-
nate the data extraction, and then transmission from every task,
so as to allow a larger link transmission capacity for the serviced
task as per (1). Moreover, the transmission of the packets by
the UAVs from a task i ∈ T to the central receiver is subject
to packet loss due to the fading on the wireless channel. In
this regard, in addition to acting as collectors, some UAVs may
act as relays for a task. For doing so, we assume that one or
more UAVs position themselves at equal distances from the
task (given that the task is already being served by at least
one collector), and hence, the collectors transmit the data to the
receiver through multi-hop UAVs, improving the probability of
successful transmission. In this context, in Rayleigh fading, the
probability of successful transmission of a packet of size B from
the collectors present at a task i ∈ T through a path of m UAVs,
Qi = {i1, . . . , im}, where i1 = i is the task being serviced, im
is the BS, and any other ih ∈ Qi is a relay-UAV, can be given
by
Pri,BS =
m−1∏
h=1
PrBihih+1 (2)
1Other types of queues, e.g., M/M/1, can also be considered without loss of
generality in the coalition formation process proposed in the remainder of this
paper.
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of the proposed model for task allocation in
wireless networks.
where Prihih+1 is the the probability of successful transmission
of a single bit from a UAV ih to a UAV (or the BS) ih+1 and
can be given by the probability of maintaining the SNR at the
receiver above a target level γ0 as follows [15]
Pri,ih+1 = exp
(
−
σ2γ0(Dih,ih+1)
α
κP˜
)
(3)
where σ2 is the Gaussian noise, κ is a path loss constant, α is
the path loss exponent, Dih,ih+1 is the distance between nodes
ih and ih+1, and P˜ is the maximum transmit power of UAV ih.
For servicing a number of tasks C ⊆ T , a group of UAVs
G ⊆M (collectors and relays) can sequentially move from one
task to the other in C with a constant velocity ν. The UAVs
stop at each task, with the collectors collecting and transmitting
the packets using the relays (if any). The collectors would move
from one task to the other, only if all the packets in queue in
the current task have been transmitted to the receiver. With this
proposed model, the final network will consist of groups of tasks
serviced by groups of UAVs, continuously. An illustration of this
model is shown in Figure 1.
Consequently, given this proposed model, the main objective
is to provide an algorithm for distributing the tasks between the
UAVs, given the operation of the UAVs previously described
and shown in Figure 1. For this purpose, the following sections
formulate a game theoretic approach for autonomously forming
a network similar to that of Figure 1.
III. UAVS TASK ALLOCATION AS A HEDONIC COALITION
FORMATION GAME
In this section, we formulate the proposed task allocation
problem as a hedonic coalition formation game with an under-
lying transferable utility, and we propose a distributed algorithm
for forming the coalition using concepts from hedonic games.
A. Initial Coalitional Game Formulation
By inspecting Figure 1, one can clearly see that the task
allocation problem among the UAVs can be mapped into the
problem of the formation of coalitions. In this regard, coalitional
game theory [16, Ch. 9] provides a suitable analytical tool for
studying the formation of cooperative groups, i.e., coalitions,
among a number of players. For the proposed model, the
coalitional game is played between the UAVs and the tasks.
Hence, the players set for the proposed task allocation coalitional
game is denoted by N , and contains both UAVs and tasks, i.e.,
N = M∪ T . In the remainder of this paper, we use the term
player to denote either a task or a UAV.
For any coalition S ⊆ N containing a number of UAVs and
a number of tasks, the UAVs belonging to this coalition can
structure themselves into collectors and relays. Subsequently,
as explained in the previous section, within each coalition, the
collector-UAVs will move from one task to the other, stopping
at each task, and transmitting all the packets available in the
queue to the central receiver, through the relay-UAVs (if any).
This proposed task servicing scheme can be mapped to a well-
known concept that is ubiquitous in computer systems, which
is the concept of a polling system [17]. In a polling system, a
single server moves between multiple queues in order to extract
the packets from each queue, in a sequential manner. Models
pertaining to polling systems have been widely developed in
various disciplines ranging from computer systems to communi-
cation networks, and different strategies for servicing the queues
exist [17–20]. For the proposed model, we map every coalition
S to a polling system with exhaustive strategy and deterministic
switchover times. For instance, the collectors of every coalition
in our model can be seen as a server that is servicing the tasks
(queues) sequentially, in a cyclic manner, i.e., after servicing
the last task in a coalition S ⊆ N , the collectors of S return to
the first task in S that they previously visited hence repeating
their route continuously. Further, whenever the collectors stop
at any task i ∈ S, they collect and transmit the data present at
this task until the queue is empty. This method of allowing the
server to service a queue until emptying the queue is known as
the exhaustive strategy for a polling system, which is applied in
every coalition of our model. Moreover, the time for the server
to move from one queue to the other is known as the switchover
time. In our model, for any coalition S, once the queue at a
task i ∈ S is emptied, the collectors and relays in a coalition
move from task i to the next task j ∈ S with a constant velocity
ν, hence incurring a switchover time θi,j . The switchover time
in our model corresponds to the time it takes for all the UAVs
(collectors and relays) to move from one task to the next, which,
assuming all UAVs start their mobility at the same time, maps
to the time needed for the farthest UAV to move from one task
to the next. Hence, given the geometry of Figure 1, it can be
easily seen that within a given coalition S, the switchover time
between two tasks will correspond to the constant time it takes
for one of the collectors to move from one of the tasks to the
next.
Having modeled every coalition S ⊆ N as a polling system,
we investigate the average delay incurred per coalition. In fact,
for polling systems, finding exact expressions for the delay at
every queue is a highly complicated task, and hence, no general
closed form expressions for the delay at every queue in a polling
system can be found [17], [18]2. In this regard, a key criterion
used for the analysis of the delay incurred by a polling system
is the pseudo-conservation law which provides closed form
expressions for weighted sum of the means of the waiting times
at the queues [17], [18]. For providing the pseudo-conservation
law for a coalition S ⊆ N composed of a number of UAVs and
a number of tasks, we make the following definitions. First, for
each task i ∈ S with an average arrival rate of λi, and served
by a number of collectors with a link transmission capacity of
µiS∩M (as given by (1)), we define ρi =
λi
µi
S∩M
. Further, we
define ρS ,
∑
i∈S∩T ρi. Given these definitions, for a coalition
S, the pseudo-conservation law is given by [18] (taking into
account that our switchover and service times are deterministic)
∑
i∈S∩T
ρiW¯i = ρS
∑
i∈S∩T
ρi
µi
S∩M
2(1− ρS)
+ ρS
θ2S
2
+
θS
2(1− ρS)
[
ρ2S −
∑
i∈S∩T
ρ2i
]
(4)
where W¯i is the mean waiting time at task i and θS =∑|S∩T |
h=1 θih,ih+1 is the sum of the switchover times given a
path of tasks {i1, . . . , i|S∩T |} followed by the UAVs, with
ih ∈ S∩T , ∀ h ∈ {1, . . . , |S∩T |} and i|S∩T |+1 = i1. Further,
for any coalition S that must form in the system, the following
condition must hold,
ρS < 1. (5)
This condition is a requirement for the stability of any polling
system [17–20] and thus, must be satisfied for any coalition
that will form in the proposed model. Otherwise, the system is
considered unstable and the delay is considered as infinite (as
demonstrated in the next sections, in our case, a coalition where
ρS ≥ 1 will never form).
For a coalition S, the UAVs must determine the order in
which the tasks in S are visited, i.e., the path {i1, . . . , i|S∩T |}
which is an ordering over the set of tasks in S given by S ∩ T .
Naturally, the UAVs must select the path that minimizes the total
switchover time for one round of data collection. This problem
is mapped into the traveling salesman problem [21], where a
salesman, i.e., the UAVs, is required to minimize the time of
visiting a series of cities, i.e., tasks. It is widely known that
the solution for the traveling salesman problem is NP-complete
[21], and hence there has been numerous heuristic algorithms for
finding an acceptable near-optimal solution. One of the simplest
of such algorithms is the nearest neighbor algorithm (also known
as the greedy algorithm) [21]. In this algorithm, starting from
a given city the salesman chooses the closet city as his next
visit. Using the nearest neighbor algorithm, the ordering of the
cities which minimizes the overall route is selected. The nearest
neighbor algorithm is sub-optimal, however, it can quickly find
a near-optimal solution (in most cases) and its computational
complexity is small (linear in the number of cities) [21], hence
2Note that, some approximations exist for polling systems under heavy traffic
or large switchover times [18], but in our problem, they are not suitable as we
require a more general delay expression.
making it suitable for complicated problems such as the task al-
location problem we are considering. Therefore, in the proposed
model, for every coalition S, the UAVs can easily work out the
nearest neighbor route for the tasks, and operate according to it.
Having modeled each coalition as a polling system, the
pseudo-conservation law in (4) allows to evaluate the cost,
in terms of average waiting time (or delay), from forming a
particular coalition. However, for every coalition, there is a
benefit, in terms of the average effective throughput that the
coalition is able to achieve. The average effective throughput
for a coalition S is given by
LS =
∑
i∈S∩T
λi · Pri,BS (6)
with Pri,BS given by (2). Through (4) and (6), one can easily
see that, adding more collectors reduces the delay, while adding
more relays improves the effective throughput, hence each UAV
role (collector or relay) possesses its own benefit for a coalition.
A suitable criterion for characterizing the utility in networks
where there is a trade off between the throughput and the delay
is the concept of system power which is defined as the ratio
of some power of the throughput and the delay (or a power of
the delay) [22]. Hence, the concept of power is an attractive
notion that allows to capture the fundamental trade off between
throughput and delay in the proposed task allocation model.
Power has been used thoroughly in literature in applications that
are sensitive to throughput as well as delay [23–25]. Mainly, for
the proposed game, the utility of every coalition S is evaluated
using a coalitional value function based on the power concept
from [25] as follows
v(S) =

δ
L
β
S
(
∑
i∈S∩T
ρiW¯i)(1−β)
if ρS < 1 & |S| > 1
0 otherwise
(7)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a throughput-delay trade off parameter. The
term δ represents the price per unit power that the network offers
to coalition S. In this sense, the utility function in (7) represents
the total revenue achieved by a coalition S, given the network
power that coalition S generates. For coalitions that consist of a
single UAV or a single task, i.e., coalitions of size 1, the utility
assigned is 0 due to the fact that such coalitions generate no
benefit for their member. Further, any coalition where condition
(5) is not satisfied is also given a zero utility, since, in this case,
the polling system that the coalition represents is unstable, and
hence having an infinite delay.
Consequently, given the set of players N , and the value
function given in (7), we define a coalitional game (N , v) with
transferable utility (TU). The utility in (7) represents the amount
of money or revenue received by a coalition, and hence, this
amount can be arbitrarily apportioned between the coalition
members, which justifies the TU nature of the game. For dividing
this utility between the players, we adopt the equal fair allocation
rule, whereby the payoff of any player i ∈ S, denoted by xSi is
simply given by
xSi =
v(S)
|S|
. (8)
The payoff xSi represents the amount of revenue that player i ∈
S receives from the total revenue v(S) that coalition S generates.
Although in traditional coalitional games, the allocation rule may
have a strong impact on the game’s solution, for the proposed
game, other allocation rules can be used with little impact on the
analysis that is presented in the rest of the paper due to the nature
and class of the proposed game which is quite different from
traditional coalitional games. In fact, as clearly seen from (4)
and (7), whenever the number of tasks in a coalition increases,
the total delay increases, hence reducing the utility from forming
a coalition. Further, in a coalition where the number of tasks is
large, the condition of stability for the polling system, as given
by (5), can be easily violated due to heavy traffic incoming
from a large number of tasks, thus, yielding a zero utility as per
(7). Hence, forming coalitions between the tasks and the UAVs
entails a cost that can limit the size of a coalition. In this regard,
traditional solution concepts for TU games, such as the core [16],
may not be applicable. In fact, in order for the core to exist,
as a solution concept, a TU coalitional game must ensure that
the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition of all players will form.
However, as seen in Figure 1 and corroborated by the utility
in (7), in general, due to the cost for coalition formation, the
grand coalition will not form. Instead, independent and disjoint
coalitions appear in the network as a result of the task allocation
process. In this regard, the proposed game is classified as a
coalition formation game [26–30], and the objective is to find
an algorithm that allows to form the coalition structure, instead
of finding only a solution concept, such as the core, which aims
mainly at stabilizing a grand coalition.
B. Task Allocation as a Hedonic Coalition Formation Game
As already mentioned, the proposed task allocation model
entails the formation of disjoint coalitions, and hence the pro-
posed game is classified as a coalition formation game. In
fact, coalition formation has been a topic of high interest in
game theory [26–30]. Notably, in [28–30], a class of coalition
formation games known as hedonic coalition formation games
is investigated. This class of games entails several interesting
properties that can be applied, not only in economics such as in
[28–30], but also in wireless networks as we will demonstrate in
this paper. The two key requirements for classifying a coalitional
game as a hedonic game are [28]
1) The payoff of any player depends solely on the members
of the coalition to which the player belongs, and
2) the coalitions form as a result of the preferences of the
players over their possible coalitions’ set.
These two conditions characterize the framework of hedonic
games. Mainly, the term hedonic pertains to the first condition
above, whereby the payoff of any player i, in a hedonic game,
must depend only on the identity of the players in the coalition to
which player i belongs, with no dependence on the other players.
For the second condition, in the remainder of this section, we
will formally define how the preferences of the players over the
coalitions can be used for the formation process. Hereafter, we
refer to the above requirements as the hedonic conditions.
Prior to investigating the application of hedonic games in the
proposed model, we introduce some definitions, taken from [28].
Definition 1: A coalition structure or a coalition partition
is defined as the set Π = {S1, . . . , Sl} which partitions the
players set N , i.e., ∀ k , Sk ⊆ N are disjoint coalitions such
that ∪lk=1Sk = N (an example of a partition Π is shown in
Figure 1).
Definition 2: Given a partition Π of N , for every player i ∈
N we denote by SΠ(i), the coalition Sk ∈ Π, such that i ∈ Sk.
In a hedonic game setting, each player must build preferences
over its own set of possible coalitions. In other words, each
player must be able to compare the coalitions, and order them
based on which coalition the player prefers being a member
of. For evaluating these preferences of the players over the
coalitions, we define the concept of a preference relation or order
as follows [28]
Definition 3: For any player i ∈ N , a preference relation or
order ºi is defined as a complete, reflexive and transitive binary
relation over the set of all coalitions that player i can possibly
form, i.e., the set {Sk ⊆ N : i ∈ Sk}.
Consequently, for a player i ∈ N , given two coalitions S1 ⊆ N
and, S2 ⊆ N such that i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S2, S1 ºi S2 indicates
that player i prefers to be part of coalition S1, over being part
of coalition S2, or at least, i prefers both coalitions equally.
Further, using the asymmetric counterpart of ºi, denoted by
≻i, S1 ≻i S2, indicates that player i strictly prefers being a
member of S1 over being a member of S2. For every application,
an adequate preference relation ºi can be defined to allow the
players to quantify their preferences. The preference relation
can be a function of many parameters, such as the payoffs that
the players receive from each coalition, the weight each player
gives to other players, and so on. Given the set of players N ,
and a preference relation ºi for every player i ∈ N , a hedonic
coalition formation game is formally defined as follows [28].
Definition 4: A hedonic coalition formation game is a coali-
tional game that satisfies the two hedonic conditions previously
prescribed, and is defined by the pair (N ,≻) where N is the
set of players, and ≻ is a profile of preferences, i.e., preference
relations, (º1, . . . ,ºN ) defined for every player in N .
Having laid out and defined the main components of hedonic
coalition formation games, we utilize this framework in order
to provide a suitable solution for the task allocation problem
proposed in Section II. For instance, the proposed task allocation
problem is easily modeled as a (N ,≻) hedonic game, where
N is the set of UAVs and tasks previously defined, and ≻
is a profile of preferences that we will shortly define. First
and foremost, clearly, for the proposed game model, given a
network partition Π of N , the payoff of any player i, depends
only on the identity of the members of the coalition to which
i belongs. In other words, the payoff of any player i depends
solely on the players in the coalition SΠ(i) (easily seen through
the formulation of Section III-A). Hence, our game verifies the
first hedonic condition.
Furthermore, for modeling the task allocation problem as a
hedonic coalition formation game, the preference relations of the
players must be clearly defined. In this regard, we define two
types of preference relations, a first type suited for indicating the
preferences of the UAVs, and a second type suited for the tasks.
Subsequently, for evaluating the preferences of any UAV i ∈M,
we define the following operation (this preference relation is
common for all UAVs, hence we denote it by ºi = ºM, ∀i ∈
M)
S2 ºM S1 ⇔ u(S2) ≥ u(S1) (9)
where S1 ⊆ N and S2 ⊆ N are any two coalitions that contain
UAV i, i.e., i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S2 and u : 2
N → R is a preference
function defined over the real line as follows
u(S) =


∞, if S = SΠ(i) & S \ {i} ⊆ T ;
0, if S ∈ h(i);
xSi . otherwise,
(10)
where Π is the current coalition partition which is in place in the
game, xSi is the payoff received by player i from any division
of the value function among the players in coalition S such as
the equal fair division given in (8), and h(i) is the history set
of player i. The history set h(i) simply contains coalitions that
player i was a part of in past instances, prior to the formation of
the current partition Π. Note that, using the defined preference
relation, the players can compare any two coalitions S1 and S2
independently of whether these two coalitions belong to Π or
not.
The main rationale behind the preference function u is as
follows. Any UAV i that is the sole UAV servicing tasks in
its current coalition S = SΠ(i), i.e., S ∩M = {i}, assigns an
infinite preference value to S. This is mainly due to the fact that
no UAV has an incentive to leave any group of tasks previously
assigned to it unattended, as the presence of this UAV is crucial
for the operation of these tasks. Hence, the maximum preference
is always given to the current coalition, if this current coalition
does not contain other UAVs. Further, no UAV has any incentive
to re-visit a coalition that it has left previously, and hence, the
UAVs assign a preference value of 0 for any coalition in their
history. Finally, for all the other cases, the preference relation
is easily generated by the UAVs by comparing the value of
the payoffs they receive from the two coalitions S1 and S2.
In summary, between two coalitions S1 and S2, a UAV i prefers
the coalition that gives the better payoff, given that the UAV is
not alone in its current coalition, and the coalition with a better
payoff is not in the history of UAV i.
For the preferences of the tasks, an analogous approach can be
taken. Formally, for evaluating the preferences of any task j ∈
T , we define the following operation (this preference relation is
common for all tasks, hence we denote it by ºj = ºT , ∀j ∈ T )
S2 ºT S1 ⇔ w(S2) ≥ w(S1) (11)
with the tasks’ preference function w defined as follows
w(S) =
{
0, if S ∈ h(i);
xSi , otherwise.
(12)
The preferences of the tasks are easily captured using the
function w. Simply, each task prefers the coalition that provides
the larger payoff xSi unless this coalition was already visited
previously and left. In that case, the preference function of
the tasks assigns a preference value of 0 for any coalition
that the task visited and left in the past. Using this preference
relation, every task can evaluate its preferences over the possible
coalitions that the task can form.
Consequently, the proposed task allocation model verifies both
hedonic conditions, and hence, the problem is easily mapped into
a (N ,≻) hedonic coalition formation game, with the preference
relations given by (9) and (11) which are also dependent on
the underlying TU coalitional game described in Section III-A.
Having formulated the problem as a hedonic game, the final
task is to provide a distributed algorithm, based on the defined
preferences, for forming the coalitions.
C. Hedonic Coalition Formation Algorithm
In the previous subsection, we modeled the task allocation
problem as a hedonic coalition formation game. Having laid
out the main building blocks, the remaining objective is to
propose an algorithm for forming the coalitions. While literature
that studies the characteristics of existing partitions in hedonic
games, such as in [28–30], is abundant, the problem of forming
the coalitions both in the hedonic and non-hedonic setting is a
challenging problem [26]. In this paper, we propose an algorithm
for coalition formation that allows the players to make selfish
decisions as to which coalitions they decide to join at any point
in time. The proposed algorithm will exploit the concepts of the
hedonic game model formulated in the previous section.
In this regard, for forming coalitions between the tasks and
the UAVs, we propose the following rule for coalition formation
Definition 5: Switch Rule - given a partition Π =
{S1, . . . , Sl} of the set of players (UAVs and tasks) N , a
player i decides to leave its current coalition SΠ(i) = Sm,
for some m ∈ {1, . . . , l} and join another coalition Sk ∈
Π∪{∅}, Sk 6= SΠ(i), if and only if Sk ∪{i} ≻i SΠ(i). Hence,
{Sm, Sk} → {Sm \ {i}, Sk ∪ {i}}.
Through a single switch rule made by any player i, any current
partition Π of N is transformed into Π′ = Π \ {Sm, Sk} ∪
{Sm \{i}, Sk ∪{i}}. In simple terms, for every partition Π, the
switch rule provides a mechanism through which any player,
task or UAV, can leave its current coalition SΠ(i), and join
another coalition Sk ∈ Π, given that the new coalition Sk ∪ {i}
is strictly preferred over SΠ(i) (through any preference relation
that i is using). Independent of the preference relations selected,
the switch rule can be seen as a selfish decision made by a player,
to move from its current coalition to a new coalition, regardless
of the effect of this move on the other players. Furthermore,
we consider that, whenever a player decides to switch from one
coalition to another, the player can maintain a history set h(i),
which is the set of coalitions that player i belonged to prior to
making a switch decision. Hence, given a partition Π, whenever
a player i decides to leave coalition Sm ∈ Π to join a different
coalition, coalition Sm is automatically stored by player i in its
history set h(i) (hence the history constitutes the coalitions that
a player i left in the past).
Consequently, we propose a coalition formation algorithm
composed of three main phases: task discovery, hedonic coalition
formation, and data collection. In the first phase, the central
command discovers the tasks that require servicing and informs
the UAVs of the locations and characteristics of the tasks (e.g.
the arrival rates), hence the UAVs have knowledge of the initial
partition Πinitial. Once the UAVs are aware of the tasks, they
can interact with each other (and with the tasks), for performing
coalition formation. Hence, the second phase of the algorithm
is the hedonic coalition formation phase. In this phase, all
the players (tasks and UAVs), investigate the possibility of
performing a switch operation. In this context, every player (task
or UAV) has a knowledge of the current structure (depending
on the nature of the tasks, they may know the structure through
the UAVs, without any need to communicate with other tasks).
Given the current structure, each player investigates its top
preference, and decides to perform a switch operation, if possible
through (9) and (11) for the UAVs and tasks respectively. We
consider that, the order in which the players make their switch
operations is random, but sequential. For any UAV, a switch
operation is easily performed as the UAV can leave its current
coalition and join the new coalition, if (9) is satisfied. For the
tasks, any task that finds out a possibility to switch, can request
the nearest UAV to perform this switch on its behalf (if the
nature of the task forbids it to act autonomously). In this regard,
through an inter-UAV communication link, the UAV selected by
the task requests to exchange the concerned task with the new
coalition that the task had selected. Following the formation of
the coalitions, the last phase of the algorithm entails the actual
data collection by the UAVs. In this phase, the UAVs move from
one task to the other, in their respective coalitions, collecting the
data and transmitting it to the central receiver, similar to a polling
system, as explained in Sections II and III-A. A summary of the
proposed algorithm is shown in Table I.
The proposed algorithm can be easily implemented in a
distributed way, since, as already explained, the switch operation
can be performed by the tasks or the UAVs independently of any
centralized entity (although the tasks may require interaction
with the closest UAV). The only information required is the
location of the tasks, which can be broadcasted by the central
command center at the beginning of all time. Further, note that,
for determining whether a UAV acts as a collector or relay within
any coalition, the players can easily compute the configuration
that maximizes the utility in (7). As the number of UAVs is
generally small, this computation is straight forward, and has
low complexity.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, the following network is set up: The central
BS (command center) is placed at the origin of a 4 km ×4 km
square area with the tasks randomly appearing in the area around
the BS. The path loss parameters are set to α = 3 and κ = 1,
the target SNR is set to γ0 = 10 dB, the pricing factor is set
to δ = 1, and the noise variance σ2 = −120 dBm. All packets
are considered of size 256 bits (typical IP packet size). The
UAVs are considered having a constant velocity of ν = 60 km/h,
a transmit power of P˜ = 100 mW, and a transmission link
capacity of µ = 768 kbps (assumed the same for all UAVs).
Further, we consider two classes of tasks in the network. A first
class that can be mapped to voice services having an arrival
rate of λ1 = 32 kbps, and a second class that can be mapped
to video services, such as the widely known Quarter Common
Intermediate Format (QCIF) format [31], having an arrival rate
TABLE I
THE PROPOSED HEDONIC COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM FOR TASK
ALLOCATION IN WIRELESS NETWORKS.
Initial State
The network is partitioned by Πinitial = {S1, . . . , Sk}.
At the beginning of all time Πinitial = N =M∪T with no tasks being
serviced by any UAV.
Three phases for the proposed hedonic coalition formation algorithm
Phase I - Task Discovery:
The central BS informs the UAVs of the initial network partition Πinitial.
Phase II - Hedonic Coalition Formation:
In this phase, hedonic coalition formation occurs.
repeat
For every player i ∈ N , given a current partition Πcurrent
(in the first round Πcurrent = Πinitial).
a) Player i investigates possible switch operations using
the preferences given, respectively, by (9) and (11) for the
UAVs and tasks.
b) Player i performs the switch operation that maximizes
its payoff as follows:
b.1) Player i updates its history h(i) by adding
coalition SΠcurrent (i), before leaving it.
b.2) Player i leaves its current coalition SΠcurrent (i).
b.3) Player i joins the new coalition that maximizes
its payoff.
until convergence to a final partition Πfinal.
Phase III - Data collection
a) The network is partitioned using Πfinal.
b) The UAVs in each coalition Sk ∈ Πfinal continuously perform
the following operations, i.e., act as a polling system with
exhaustive strategy and switchover times:
b.1) Visit a first task in their respective coalitions.
b.2) The collector-UAVs collect the data from the task that is
being visited.
b.3) The collector-UAVs transmit the data using wireless links
to the BS either directly, or through other relay-UAVs.
b.4) Once the queue of the current is empty, visit the next task.
The order in which the tasks are visited is determined by the nearest
neighbor solution to the traveling salesman problem (Section III-A).
The third phase is continuously repeated and performed by all UAVs
in Πfinal.
λ2 = 128 kbps. Tasks belonging to each class are generated
with equal probability. The trade off parameter β is set to 0.7,
to indicate services that are reasonably delay tolerant.
In Figure 2, we assess the performance of the proposed
hedonic coalition formation algorithm, in terms of the average
payoff (revenue) per player (UAV or task) for a network having
M = 5 UAVs, as the number of tasks increases. The results are
averaged over the random positions of the tasks (each task can
belong to one of the two classes previously mentioned with equal
probability). In this figure, we compare the performance with an
algorithm that assigns the tasks equally among the UAVs (i.e. an
equal group of neighboring tasks are assigned for every UAV).
Figure 2 shows that the performance of both algorithms is apt to
decrease as the number of tasks increases. This is mainly due to
the fact that, for networks having a larger number of tasks, the
delay incurred per coalition, and thus per user increases. This
increase in the delay is not only due to the increase in the number
of tasks, but also to the increase in the distance that the UAVs
need to travel within their corresponding coalitions (increase
in switchover times). However, it is clear that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the equal allocation at all network sizes.
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Fig. 2. Performance assessment, in terms of average player (UAV or task) payoff
(revenue), of the proposed hedonic coalition formation algorithm compared to
an algorithm that allocates the neighboring tasks equally among the UAVs as
the number of tasks increases for M = 5 UAVs.
This performance improvement decreases with the increase in
the number of tasks, but the improvement, in terms of average
payoff, yielded by the proposed algorithm is no less than 61.96%
better than the equal allocation (at T = 25). The reduction in
the performance gap between the two algorithms stems from the
fact that, as more tasks exist in the network, for a fixed number
of UAVs, the possibility of forming large coalitions, through the
proposed hedonic coalition formation algorithm is reduced, and
hence the structure becomes closer to equal allocation.
In Figure 3, we show a snapshot of the final network parti-
tion reached through the proposed hedonic coalition formation
algorithm for a network of M = 5 UAVs and T = 10 randomly
located tasks. In this figure, tasks 1, 3, and 8 belong to the
QCIF video class, while the remaining tasks belong to the voice
class. Through Figure 3, it is shown how the UAVs and tasks
can agree on a partition whereby a number of UAVs service a
group of nearby tasks. For the network of Figure 3, the tasks are
distributed into three coalitions, two of which (coalitions S1 and
S3) are served by a single collector-UAV. In contrast, coalition
S2 is served by two collectors and one relay. The UAVs in
coalition 2 divided their roles depending on the achieved utility.
For instance, having two collectors and one relay provides a
utility of coalition is S2 is v(S2) = 51.48 while having three
collectors yields a utility of v(S2) = 10.92 , and having one
collector and two relays yields a utility of v(S2) = 44.39 .
Clearly, the case of two collectors and one relay maximizes the
utility and is agreed upon between the players. Finally, it must
be noted that, the coalitions in Figure 3 are dynamic, in the
sense that, within each coalition, the UAVs move from one task
to the other, collecting and transmitting data to the . The order
in which the UAVs visit the tasks, as indicated in Figure 3,
is generated using a nearest neighbor solution for the traveling
salesman problem (see Section III-A).
Finally, in Figure 3, we show the average coalition size
resulting from the proposed algorithm as the number of tasks
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Fig. 3. A snapshot of a final coalition structure resulting from the proposed
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T = 10 tasks.
T increases, for a network of M = 5 UAVs and randomly
deployed tasks. The results are compared with the equal allo-
cation algorithm. In this figure, we note that, as the number of
tasks increases, the average coalition size for both algorithms
increases. For the proposed algorithm, this is an immediate
result of the fact that, as the number of tasks increases the
probability of forming larger coalitions is higher. Further, at all
network sizes, the proposed algorithm yields larger coalitions
than the equal allocation algorithm. This result implies that,
by allowing the players (tasks and UAVs) to selfishly select
their coalitions, through the proposed algorithm, the players
have an incentive to structure themselves in relatively large
coalitions. In a nutshell, through hedonic coalition formation,
the resulting topology, generally consists of a small number of
large coalitions, rather than a large number of small coalitions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel model for task allo-
cation among a number of agents, such as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) in a wireless communication network. In the
proposed model, a number of UAVs are required to service
several tasks, randomly located in a given area. Each task
represents a queue of packets that require collection and wireless
transmission to a centralized receiver by the UAVs. The task
allocation problem is modeled as a hedonic coalition formation
game between the UAVs and the tasks that interact in order to
form disjoint coalitions. Each formed coalition is mapped to a
polling system which consists of a number of UAVs continuously
collecting packets from a number of tasks. Within a coalition, the
UAVs can act either as collectors that move between the different
tasks present in the coalition for collecting the packet data,
or relays for improving the wireless transmission of the data
packets. For forming the coalitions, we propose an algorithm that
allows the players (tasks or UAVs) to join or leave the coalitions
based on their preferences which capture the trade off between
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Fig. 4. Average coalition size yielded by the proposed hedonic coalition
formation algorithm and an algorithm that allocates the neighboring tasks equally
among the UAVs, as a function of the number of tasks T for a network of 5
UAVs.
the effective throughput and the delay achieved by the coalition.
Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm allows the
UAVs and tasks to self-organize into independent coalitions,
while improving the performance, in terms of average player
(UAV or task) payoff, of at least 61.96% relatively to a scheme
that allocates nearby tasks equally among UAVs. In a nutshell,
by combining concepts from wireless networks, queueing theory
and novel concepts from coalitional game theory, we proposed
a new model for task allocation among autonomous agents in
communication networks which is well suited for many practical
applications such as surveillance, monitoring, or data collection
in wireless networks.
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